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Abstract
In order to show that technology mediates between man and machine, I will discuss in this text a
literally other or alter-knowledge system that also heavily relied on self-writing machines:
spiritualism. Contrary to scientific knowledge systems, in spiritualism the unforeseen, the singular,
and the disturbance is what counts as, and produces, significance. That is the reason why alter-
concepts such as spiritualism, esotericism, or occultism are not typically recognized as innovative
agencies in the history of knowledge. Hence, what is needed to raise the question of a non-hegemonic
knowledge production is a symmetrical approach in the history of technology.
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“Tool-Being” and Coin Rubbing 
It is Monday, 8:15 AM, at the Güntzelstraße underground station. The academic 
week starts early with an important meeting at nine o’clock. I have to buy a ticket, 
and because I know I will be in a rush, I have lined up my coins for the automatic 
ticket dispenser that awaits me on the train platform.  
Everything seems to be going fine until one of the coins that I deposited in 
the machine unceremoniously pops out where I had expected to receive my ticket. 
It has been rejected. My first instinct is to try the coin once more. Maybe the 
machine made a mistake. Maybe I didn’t throw the coin correctly into the slot. 
Maybe something else went wrong. So I try again. But now the situation between 
the machine and me has changed significantly. I am no longer an ordinary user 
following the path of unstated rules and non-cognitive techniques. Now I am self-
consciously subject to human-machine calculations and projections, a kind of 
techno-practical setup whose very noticeability is evidence enough of a system 
failure. I now realize that I am always already interwoven in a network of “Tool-
Being”.1 As I deposit the coin a third and fourth time, each attempt quickly 
followed by the sound of rattling in the tin tray beneath, I feel myself wavering 
between the position of a first order subject and a second order observer of this 
repetitive loop.  
Martin Heidegger described a similar scene in a well-known passage on 
the hammer in the first part and first division of Being and Time (1927). Here, 
everyday Being-in-the-world is interrupted because the tool is no longer ready-to-
hand. As long as everything is working well, we don’t think about the hammer or 
the machine. Automatisms, so to speak, govern a network of action among 
humans, tools, and environments of everyday life. Things in our environment are 
ready-to-hand in the sense that they just do the job they are supposed or designed 
to do; we, in turn, perform as an unquestioned and unreflected part of the 
environment. In this context Martin Heidegger asks what philosophy can learn if 
something interrupts this flow: 
In our dealings with the world of our concern, the un-ready-to-
hand can be encountered not only in the sense of that which is 
unusable or simply missing, but as something un-ready-to-hand 
which is not missing at all and not unusable, but which ‘stands in 
the way’ of our concern. […] Anything which is un-ready-to-hand 
in this way is disturbing to us, and enables us to see the obstinacy 
                                                 
1 Cf. Graham Harman, Tool-Being. Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects 
(Chicago/La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 2002). 
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of that with which we must concern ourselves in the first instance 
before we do anything else.2 
Perhaps we should not turn this passage into the skeleton key to Heidegger’s 
entire philosophy or view it as the secret to all phenomenological reasoning.3 
What is more interesting for the “question of the self” is the structure of transition 
between these two states of behavior. One might assume that the transition 
between the positions of using a tool and that of observing the use of a tool is 
instantaneous and binary: In the moment the coin falls through the ticket machine 
for the first time, I am thrown out of the ready-to-hand flow and forced to observe 
the situation.4 This observation seems to fit perfectly to the situation I have 
described in the beginning. The disturbance causes an instant change of the 
human-machine relation. And this transition also seems to be irreversible in some 
way: It’s impossible to quickly return to readiness-to-hand—the disturbance 
needs time to disappear. However, in the discussion that follows, I would like to 
show that automatisms in behavior (as well as their disturbance) pose a deeper 
and more elusive set of questions that concern not only technology, but also 
what’s commonly termed “the occult.” Moreover, this problem troubles the very 
distinction often assumed between supposedly rational technology and supposedly 
irrational occultism. In this way, the issue of tool use and automatisms also calls 
into question the general framework of rationality presumed to govern over 
modern technology (and perhaps calls into question of modern rationality insofar 
as it is determined in our era by technology). 
                                                 
2 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, transl. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson 
(Oxford UK/Cambridge USA: Blackwell, 2001), 103. 
3 Cf. Harman, Tool-Being. Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects, 4. 
4 Cf. Jonathan Hale, “Harman on Heidegger: ‘Buildings as Tool-Beings’,” in: 
bodyoftheory (2013), accessed March 3, 2015, 
http://bodyoftheory.com/2013/05/29/harman-on-heidegger-buildings-as-tool-beings/,  
in reference to Graham Harman, “Objets et Architecture. Objects and Architecture,” 
in: Naturaliser l’Architecture. Naturalizing Architecture, ed. Marie-Ange Brayer and 
Frédéric Migayro (Orléans: Editions HYX, 2013), 234–243. 
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 Figure 1—Rubbing traces on a pay phone. 
Hence let’s have a look what happens next at the Güntzelstraße 
underground station. The more often I insert a coin into the ticket dispenser, the 
more disturbed the script of this human-machine interaction appears—and the 
more I become a kind of displaced, outside observer (who, to boot, still needs a 
ticket). After a handful of attempts the situation is more or less clear: The 
machine has classified my coin as illegitimate. The problem, however, is that I 
know the coin is authentic—and that, on contrary, it is the machine which is 
flawed. Whither the technical setup now? All routes have been tried, trial-and-
error has failed, the human, machine, and the numismatic pieces at play reveal no 
compatible alignment. A radical move at last presents itself: I take one of the 
coins and rub its flat side along the surface of the machine. Why? I don’t know. 
This is not experimental, per se, nor it is premeditated. It’s done by myself and 
innumerable other automat users (in Germany at least) everyday. If you take a 
closer look on machine’s surfaces you will find many scratching marks around the 
coin slots. I do it because they do it. They do it because I do it. Nobody taught me 
to behave like this and there is no book or scientific study that evaluates the pros 
and cons of rubbing rejected coins on a machine’s surface. This is common 
everyday cultural practice. 
Now, what is the guiding problem behind the situation I’ve described? 
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Firstly, it doesn’t make sense to describe this situation in terms of functioning tool 
versus broken tool. The ticket vending machine functions throughout but in an 
ambiguous, unexpected, and unpredictable manner. In this essentially complex 
situation my own actions can’t be separated from the network and cannot be 
described as either rational or irrational.5 Secondly it would be misleading to 
define a point of rupture when a non-rational practice like coin rubbing or kicking 
a machine transforms the (broken) unreadiness-to-hand into a (working) 
readiness-to-hand. Nor does it make sense to emphasize a rational or scientific 
mode of observing present-at-hand that would find and isolate the moment of 
disturbance in order to repair the broken tool. Hence, the essence of the situation 
cannot be understood as a transition between two states. Rather, they are modes 
coexistence or complementarity. 
This leads me, thirdly, to the assertion that the story of the rubbing traces 
is no single incident but some sort of primal scene of technology: My argument is 
that we can explain (using a term of Gilbert Simondon) the “Essence of 
Technicity” of tools as residing in the border area between ready-at-hand and 
present-at-hand. If, however, this is the case, than the disturbance must be 
regarded not as an exception, but rather as the normal condition of technology. As 
Gilbert Simondon puts it, automatism is not necessarily the higher form of 
technology.6 In other words, the key element to understand our relation with 
technology, things, and tools (or, in Bruno Latour’s terminology, the network of 
human and nonhuman agency), is not the function but rather the dysfunction that 
is essential. This brings me now and perhaps a bit surprisingly to the so-called 
“self-recording [selbstschreibende] machines” because in the course of the 
nineteenth-century this variety of apparatus genre was developed to solve these 
kinds of disturbances by separating the reliable measuring machine from the 
unreliable human operator. What happened to me at the Güntzelstraße should (or 
could) have been prevented by self-writing machines. 
 
                                                 
5 John Tresch identifies this irrational dimension of technology with a whole new set of 
machines, the “romantic machines”, which came up in the 1820s. See John Tresch, 
The Romantic Machine. Utopian Science and Technology after Napoleon (Chicago, 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 12. An analogue argumentation can 
be found in Henning Schmidgen’s reconstruction of the “Donders Machine”, see 
Henning Schmidgen, “Die Donders-Maschine. Ein Kapitel Physiologiegeschichte mit 
Deleuze und Guattari” in: Lebendige Zeit: Wissenskulturen im Werden, ed. Henning 
Schmidgen (Berlin: Kulturverlag Kadmos, 2005). 
6 Cf. Gilbert Simondon, Die Existenzweise technischer Objekte (Zürich: Diaphanes 
Verlag, 2012), 11. 
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Self-Writing Machines 
To repeat my central question once more: Is the disturbance an essential or is it an 
accidental aspect of the “essence of technicity”? According to Heidegger, “that” 
something is being made or simply “that something is” disappears in its 
usefulness.7 This would mean either that we have to combine Heidegger’s 
philosophy with a broader concept of disturbance—leading perhaps to Graham 
Harman’s reading of Heidegger—or that we have to take into account the 
difference between a relative simple tool like a hammer and a more complex 
apparatus like an ticket dispenser or a self-writing machine.8 I will come back to 
this point at the end of this paper. Right now I will start with the assumption that 
we can reconstruct the epistemic dimension of disturbance particularly well 
through the historic example of self-writing machines. In German, a self-
recording device is termed a Selbstschreiber—literally a “self-writer.” This begs 
the question what is the self that observes, records and writes in self-writing 
apparatuses? If the self totally disappears in the apparatus, can there be any 
disturbance? 
Following the argument of historians of science from Hebbel Hoff and 
Leslie Geddes up to Lorraine Daston and Peter Galision, this Selbst is a metaphor 
for the fiction of objectivity.9 It is mainly the experimentator and his uncertain 
relation to the laboratory that contaminates the observation, the measuring 
process, and thus the production of knowledge. Hence the fiction of self-recording 
instruments is to extract the human body from the laboratory and to design 
apparatuses in which the nature transforms itself into legible traces. The self of 
the human experimenter is replaced by a technical object (or technical self) that is 
in itself part of the nature it (the machine) observes. Technology can observe 
nature innocently while the human body becomes increasingly uncontrollable or 
                                                 
7 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: 
Harper, 1993), 190. 
8 In this paper, apparatus should be defined as the way in which the parts of a technical 
object are arranged. That means firstly that every apparatus is made up of parts 
having their own history and agency. An apparatus is a network of things. Secondly 
an apparatus genre is a stable set of (mostly institutionalized) practices to compound 
technical things for more or less concrete and urgent need. See: Giorgio Agamben, 
What is an Apparatus? And Other Essays, transl. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella 
(Stanford, California: Standford University Press, 2006), 8, in reference to Foucault. 
9 Cf. Hebbel E. Hoff and Leslie A. Geddes, “The Beginning of Graphic Recording,” in: 
ISIS 53.2, no. 172 (1962), and Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (New 
York: Zone Books, 2007). 
Kassung / Self-Writing Machines
communication+1 Vol. 4 [2015], Iss. 1, Article 5
5
unreliable in the course of the nineteenth-century.10 
The area of reality that self-writing machines are supposed to explore and 
measure is the human body itself. Automatic recording devices are foremost 
psycho-physical instruments, meaning that they apply the precise measurement of 
the physical world (back) onto the measuring subject. This operation can only 
succeed when the human self disappears i. e. when it is displaced from human to 
machine. Hence psychoanalysis, evolution theory, and physiology on the one side, 
and physics, engineering, and measuring technology on the other side, each 
stabilizing one another: The more we know about embodied human being, the 
more it is taken out of knowledge production. It is technology that mediates 
between man and machine. Or, to put it the other way around: We can define 
technology as the apparatus that mediates between man and machine.11 This 
central epistemic strategy drives the rise of the natural sciences in the course of 
the long nineteenth-century. At the same time this strategy of delegating parts of 
the knowledge production to machines restabilizes human subjectivity: 
Technology replaces world and at the same time constitutes world.12 
 
Figure 2—Measuring the duration of simply psychic processes. 
To start with a well-known example: The kymograph was designed to 
                                                 
10 In this context, it should be noted that the likes of William James and Gertrude Stein 
studied “automatic writing” in the context of their psychic research. 
11 Cf. this remarkably modern concept of Pierre Bertaux, “Maschine – Denkmaschine – 
Staatsmaschine. Entwicklungstendenzen der modernen Industriegesellschaft,” in: 
Protokoll 9. Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis, (1963), 4, accessed August 18, 2014, 
http://www.koerber-stiftung.de/internationale-politik/bergedorfer-
gespraechskreis/protokolle/protokoll-detail/BG/maschine-denkmaschine-
staatsmaschine. 
12 Cf. Agamben, What is an Apparatus? And Other Essays, 15–17. 
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measure the speed of mental processes.  Broad interest developed in this field 
after Hermann von Helmholtz around 1850 demonstrated experimentally that a 
brainwave has nothing in common with a sudden flash but is a slow or at least 
unhurried propagation mechanism. This is the instrumental context in which 
Johannes von Kries and Felix Auerbach 1877 raised the question of the duration 
of simple mental processes. The epistemic background was a semiotic conception 
of mental communication.13 Now the key proposition in Kries’s and Auerbach’s 
measuring setup is that one can identify the most basic sign and the shortest 
signal. In order to measure and to define this shortest signal, the experimenters 
relied on the technology of a self-writing apparatus: The amplitude of the signal 
was written by the machine on a rotating drum. This magnification of the signal’s 
time-base produced a legible curve. What the experimenter could thereby ideally 
observe was the mental process itself, because no human interaction had disturbed 
the signal. Or, as Kries and Auerbach put it in their paper: 
Unser Bewusstsein aber findet, wenn es sich selbst beobachtet, 
dieses Material niemals im rohen Zustand, sondern in fertiger 
Bearbeitung vor.14 
[Our consciousness, however, when it observes itself, won’t find 
this material in a raw state but rather in a pre-processed condition.] 
This raw state could only be explored by the apparatus itself, and this technology 
was stable, reliable, and generally usable: 
Wiewohl wir die Versuche auf den Tast-, Gehörs- und 
Gesichtssinn erstreckt haben, ist doch der wesentlichste Theil des 
zur Anwendung kommenden Apparates allen diesen Versuchen 
gemeinsam […] Als zeitmessende Vorrichtung diente uns stets die 
rotirende Trommel des Kymographion.15 
[Despite having extended the experiments to the faculties of touch, 
hearing, and vision, the essential aspect of the apparatus used here 
is identical for all these experiments. The rotating cylinder of the 
Kymograph served to measure the passage of time.] 
                                                 
13 Cf. Johannes Kries and Felix Auerbach, “Die Zeitdauer einfachster psychischer 
Vorgänge,“ in: Archiv für Physiologie (1877), 297–378 (quote: 300). The analogy 
between the telegraphic and the nervous system has been widely discussed, see: 
Laura Otis, “Das Spinnennetz. Körperliche und technische Kommunikationssysteme 
des 19. Jahrhunderts,“ in: “fülle der combination“. Literaturforschung und 
Wissenschaftsgeschichte, ed. Bernhard Dotzler and Sigrid Weigel (München: 
Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2005), 35–49. 
14 Kries and Auerbach, „Die Zeitdauer einfachster psychischer Vorgänge,“ 298. 
15 Ibid., 302. 
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To briefly sum up: Starting around 1850 self-writing apparatuses or self-recording 
instruments promised an escape from an uncanny human-world relation and a 
release into the freedoms of scientific objectivity by automatically translating a 
natural phenomenon into a mathematical curve.16 The diagramming of nature 
without human interference, developing traces of ever finer and more precise 
character, accelerating technological progress, and an increasing knowledge 
production, evolve simultaneously. The story of my paper hitherto seems to be 
one of a technological arrow of time defined by successive marginalization of the 
uncanny, the irrational, and disturbance. Hence, when there is an unsettling 
impact of technology it would (seem to) come from outside, as a social, 
individual, or emotional surplus that had nothing to do with the history of the 
machines, the devices, and the techniques in themselves. I will now try to 
demonstrate that such an account does not adequately grasp to the cultural 
dynamics of technology. 
In order to show that technology mediates between human and machine in 
the unstable border area between readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand, I will 
discuss in the following a literally other or alter-knowledge system that also 
heavily relied on self-writing machines. I am talking about spiritualism. Contrary 
to scientific knowledge systems, in spiritualism the unforeseen, the singular, and 
the disturbance is what counts as, and produces, significance. That is the reason 
why alter-concepts such as spiritualism, esotericism, or occultism are not typically 
recognized as innovative agencies in the history of knowledge. Hence, what is 
needed to raise the question of a non-hegemonic knowledge production is a 
symmetrical approach to the history of technology. 
Thus what does symmetry between technical and occult apparatuses 
mean? Following Bruno Latour there is a first symmetry principle that permits us 
to legitimize truth or non-truth by reference to nature.17 What is truth and non-
truth are both defined by society—hence historically and culturally variable. If we 
assume for the nineteenth-century industrial societies that the natural sciences 
were a model for reason and truth, it becomes clear that spiritualist experiments 
                                                 
16 Cf. hereto in detail: Stefan Rieger, Schall und Rauch. Eine Mediengeschichte der 
Kurve (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2009). 
17 Cf. Richard Noakes, “The Historiography of Psychical Research: Lessons from 
Histories of the Science,” in: Journal of the Society of Psychical Research 72.2, no. 
891 (2008), 65–85. Michel Callon, “Einige Elemente einer Soziologie der 
Übersetzung: Die Domestikation der Kammuscheln und der Fischer der St. Brieuc-
Bucht,“ in: ANThology. Ein einführendes Handbuch zur Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie, 
ed. Andréa Belliger and David J. Krieger (Bielefeld: transcript, 1986). 
Bruno Latour, Wir sind nie modern gewesen. Versuch einer symmetrischen 
Anthropologie (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1991). 
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followed the rules of science in order to at least gain attention.18 This approach 
produces symmetry between truth and non-truth but not between society and 
nature nor between different knowledge cultures. It therefore fails to describe the 
(scientific or occult) apparatus as human-machine relation. The scientific 
knowledge serves as a hegemonic discourse, stabilized by asymmetric structures 
and allowing the occult practices only to fail. Thus, to get a fully symmetrical 
perspective, one has to go a step further and assume that society and nature, or, in 
our case, man and machine, require the same level of explanation. Following the 
second symmetry principle means that machines and their concrete materiality 
must be given the same analytical attention and accuracy as the social. Against 
this methodological background, I will now discuss a spiritualistic apparatus 
genre in order to illustrate this “open plurality of techniques” and to get back the 
role of disturbance in the interrelation between readiness-to-hand and presence-at-
hand.19 
Occultism and Rational Justification 
Current research suggests that the first spiritualist self-recording apparatus was 
filed for a patent in 1854. The German musician and inventor Adolphus Theodore 
Wagner filed an application for an “Apparatus for Indicating a Person’s Thoughts 
by the Agency of Nervous Electricity,” a.k.a. a psychograph, on January 23th, 
1854, in London. In the provisional specification, Wagner writes: 
The apparatus consists of a combination of rods or pieces of wood 
joined so as to permit of free action in all the parts. From one of 
the legs of the instrument hangs a tracer; on one or more of the 
other extremities is fixed a disc, upon which the operator is to 
place his hand, and from this extremity or these extremities 
depends another tracer. The other parts of the apparatus consist of 
a glass slab or other non-conductor, and of an alphabet and set of 
figures or numerals. Upon a person possessing nervous electricity 
placing his hand upon one of the discs the instrument will 
immediately work, and the tracer will spell upon the alphabet what 
is passing in the operator’s mind.20 
                                                 
18 Cf. Johanna Bohley, “Klopfzeichen, Experiment, Apparat. Geisterbefragungen im 
deutschenSpiritismus der 1850er Jahre,” in: Pseudowissenschaft. Konzeptionen von 
Nichtwissenschaftlichkeit in der Wissenschaftsgeschichte, ed. Dirk Rupnow et al. 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2008), 100–126 (quote: 101). This paper shows also 
the shortcomings of the first symmetry principle. 
19 Simondon, Die Existenzweise technischer Objekte, 12. 
20 Adolphus Theodore Wagner, “Apparatus for Indicating a Person’s Thoughts by the 
Agency of Nervous Electricity,” in: Provisional Specification, Office of the 
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The structural similarity with the measurements of the device of Kries and 
Auerbach is astonishing: Supposing that the nervous communication mechanism 
is sign-based, the characters can easily be detected by increasing the sensitivity of 
the instrument and by translating the output into a human legible form. Wagner 
didn’t use a cylinder-based translation of the signals but (as we know from the 
report of Freiherr von Forstner) a cranesbill or pantograph.21 His psychograph 
directly recorded the movements of the sitter’s hand as they moved without the 
sitter’s volition. In this respect Wagner’s invention can be regarded as the first 
patented spiritualist self-recording device and, as such, the first precursor of the 
well-known planchette or ouija board. 
 
Figure 3—Wagner’s cranesbill-like psychograph. 
Now, what does it mean that Wagner’s psychograph was officially 
recognized as a patented invention?  First of all it should be noted that we go 
astray when we assume a gap between rational purpose and irrational over-
determination of technology. It is by no means contradictory to gain a technical 
patent for a spiritualist apparatus. This apparatus is, in fact, technology. The 
dichotomy established after the fact between occult and scientific knowledge 
                                                                                                                                     
Commissioners of Patents, no. 173 (London: Eyre and Spottiswood, January 23, 
1854). It should be noted that Wagner’s London patent was merely an application 
that he filed, and while he received provisional protection on the design, the patent 
was actually abandoned when he failed to proceed with the next part of the in fact 
very complex process. 
21 Cf. Alexander Freiherr von Forstner, Der Psychograph oder Seelenschreiber des 
Herrn Musikdirektors A. Wagner in Berlin. Oder: Beschreibung eines Instrumentes, 
welches die Erscheinungen des Tischklopfens auf eine neue, sehr vereinfachte Weise 
darstellt (Berlin: A. Wagner, 1853), 5. 
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(which at least is a hegemonic one and therefore requires institutionalization) does 
not have necessary relevance for emerging technologies. Or, to put it the other 
way around: Emerging technology can be described in essence by its retrospective 
over-determination with attributes or functions that seem to be contradictory. 
This last argument has serious consequences for Heidegger’s tool-analysis 
and for the relation between tools in action and tools in disrepair. Technology 
always points to an open future, to not yet stable practices, and to new forms of 
usage. In the realm of spiritualist apparatuses such as Wagner’s psychograph this 
essential intersection of readiness-to-hand and unreadiness-to-hand comes into 
focus and marks a relevant distinction between technology and tool: Technology 
is always ready-to-hand and unready-to-hand. It oscillates between the pure, 
reliable but cold presence of equipmentality and the open, unstable but hot future 
of technology.22 This fact has significant consequences for the question of the self, 
as will be discussed below. 
The principal over-determination of technology becomes fully clear when 
we compare Wagner’s psychograph with the same apparatus of the German 
psychiatrist Karl Robert Sommer. This device is just one example of the 150 
apparatuses for studying the sensations and the higher psychical processes 
reported in Arthur MacDonald’s 1898 comprehensive review of state-of-the-art 
technologies in the experimental study of children. Sommer’s aim is to find 
measuring methods for previously unknown or at least unobservable psychic 
phenomena.23 The psychograph in particular had been developed to investigate the 
“unconscious movements of the hand.”24 Certainly it is not the movement of a 
hand rubbing a coin over the surface of a ticket machine, what is meant by this—
though coin rubbing shurely can be described as an unconscious action. Sommer’s 
main concern is to “lessen friction as much as possible, for recording the slightest 
movement of the hand. This […] difficulty is overcome by employing systems of 
levers, reducing the friction to a minimum.”25 
                                                 
22 Cf. Heidegger, Basic Writings, 160–161. 
23 Cf. Karl Robert Sommer, Lehrbuch der psychopathologischen Untersuchungs-
Methoden (Berlin, Wien: Urban & Schwarzenberg, 1899), 3. 
24 Arthur Macdonald, Experimental Study of Children, Including Anthropometrical and 
Psycho-physical Measurements of Washington School Children (Washington, D. C.: 
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1899), 1164. 
25 Ibid., 1165. 
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 Figure 4—Sommer’s psychograph. 
Wagner’s and Sommer’s apparatuses inspired countless successors and 
imitators.26 These later devices variously lessened the friction, observed more 
subtle signals, sought to enlarge the sphere of objectivity, and so on. Though 
historians in the recent decades have replaced the concept of discernible ruptures 
(often bound to outstanding persons) by models of transformation, networks, and 
complexity, there is general agreement that technology produces differences that 
distinguish older from newer things.27 The technological object is a material 
distinction which creates a temporal difference, and thereby, meaning. And 
inevitably every technological object anticipates successors that would be even 
more reliable. A technological object shifts from the future to its own past at the 
very moment when it is used for the first time. And at the same moment it 
generates a new future in form of a promise for a better usability. It works and it 
will work better. It is this technological object and the succeeding one. It 
                                                 
26 The most recent patent for a psychograph is from 1983, cf. United States Patent and 
Trademark Office 4,371,167. 
27 In recent discussions following Gilbert Simondon’s approach, the concept of ruptures 
is gaining new attention. Cf. Simondon, Die Existenzweise technischer Objekte, 26. 
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functions and it fails. Because we use a technological object we rely on the 
following, and the following, and the following technical object. Technology is a 
chain of objects, and we anticipate this chain with every single object we use. 
Although humans create these chains of technological objects they are heavily 
intertwined with them. 
The situation of the apparatus is, in other words, essentially complex. On 
the one hand a great number of machines were developed and manufactured with 
the aim of exploring the unconscious by turning the measuring object into an 
experimenting subject, into a Selbstschreiber. On the other hand all these 
machines, from Heidegger’s hammer up to the modern ticket vending machine, 
only function through the interaction with a human experimenter, user, or 
consumer. Machines tend to become more and more auto-matic, but at the same 
time they create an increasingly inextricable enmeshing of man and machine: The 
status of the self is always fragile. What John Tresch writes for the romantic 
machine, that “it involved the active participation of the observer and [that it] 
articulated a spontaneous, living, and constantly developing nature” counts for all 
technical objects, be they scientific or spiritualistic.28 Thus disturbance is always 
part of technology while its social use is at the same time a promise for stability, 
comprehensibility, and predictability. 
The Magical Dimension of Technology 
Now what remains is the still uncanny practice of rubbing a coin over the surface 
of a ticket machine. When the ticket machine malfunctions and thus brings itself 
to attention, myself or any other user is trying to re-establish a state of usefulness. 
Or, as Heidegger puts it, “The usefulness of equipment is nevertheless only the 
essential consequence of reliability.”29 In this situation of lost usefulness and 
reliability the person performs an action that seems to have nothing to do with the 
preprogrammed human-machine environment. We learned from the symmetric 
approach to technology that we go astray if we describe this action as an 
irrational, occult, or premodern form of communication. So, what are the deeper 
epistemic roots of this action? 
In order to answer this question it is worth remembering that in the course of 
the nineteenth-century technology became interconnected with something 
radically new: the enclosure (or “chassis”). As the machine became more and 
more complex and hazardous, engineers developed an enclosing skin to protect 
man and machine from one other. New, sometimes even invisible energy forms 
such as electricity had to be shielded from users. The complexity of the functions 
                                                 
28 Tresch, The Romantic Machine, 12. 
29 Heidegger, Basic Writings, 160. 
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had to be reduced to clear and distinct ends. The widespread and even daily use of 
technology required both a shielding from dangers and simplification in purposes. 
This leads to a great paradigm shift in the “Essence of Technicity”: All 
communication between human and machine became interface based. The 
interface became the enclosure, providing design, protection, and usability all at 
once. Enclosures rendered machines simple.30 
What does this symbiosis mean for the foregoing discussions? Is the 
enclosure the area at which the intersection of the tool in action and the tool in 
disrepair culminates? If, however, the skin or enclosure is the main and only way 
to communicate with the machine, than what happens in case of malfunction? An 
apparatus refusing to work evokes strategies of communication beyond the 
interface, directly through the enclosure, disregarding all common channels and 
modes of the human-machine relation, such as rubbing a coin over the machine’s 
surface. Seen in this light coin rubbing is no occult, irrational, or in other ways 
uncanny condition of the “Tool-Being.” On the contrary this praxis is based 
directly on the history of technology and shows that (unlike Heidegger’s hammer) 
technology can never fully recede from consciousness. 
There is thus a double life of equipment—tool in action, tool in 
disrepair. These two planes would seem never to intersect, since the visibility 
of the tool immediately marks its cessation as equipment. But in fact, their 
point of intersection provides what amounts to the central theme for 
Heidegger’s philosophy, namely, the as-structure. Through the “as,” the two 
worlds actually turn out to exist only in communion, in constant intersection 
with one another.31 
Existing in communion means that there will always be a successor 
apparatus, because technology mediates between human and machine in the 
intersection of the working tool and broken tool. Technology can never be a 
simple tool like a hammer—it’s always a promise for the future. We cannot 
reduce technology to its purpose and usability because technology always implies 
a promise, namely that of a better controllability of the future. This promise 
doesn’t originate in real technological progress but in the firm belief that there 
will be an ever better human-machine relation, in any sense of the word better. 
Hence Being-in-the-world always means Being-in-disturbance. 
 
                                                 
30 Cf. Latour’s concept of black-boxing, in: Christian Kassung and Albert Kümmel-
Schnur, “Wissensgeschichte als Malerarbeit? Ein Trialog über das Weißeln 
schwarzer Kisten,“ in: Bruno Latours Kollektive, ed. Georg Kneer, Markus Schroer 
and Erhard Schüttpelz (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2008), 155–179. 
31 Harman, Tool Being. Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects, 45. 
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